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Medical Witness' Treatment by Courts
Monroe E. Trout*
P ROFESSIONAL MEDICAL WITNESSES are often treated with suspicion by
the courts. In the New York case of Quinones v. St. Vincent's Hos-
pital,1 the court said of one such doctor:
He had no personal knowledge of any of the material facts and such
opinions as appear in his testimony would not support a verdict on
plaintiff's theory. . . . Therefore, the opinion of the doctor that the
plaintiff sustained the alleged traumatic injury sometime between
the time of the operation and the next day when she felt pain would
not support a finding that the injury occurred during the period of
unconsciousness. . . . Thus, the doctor's opinion does not, in any
event, have the necessary factual background. His conclusions lack
probative force in that they are "contingent, speculative or merely
possible."
The courts, as well as the medical profession, should be contemp-
tuous of individuals who make a living by going from one negligence
case to another to testify about injuries or disabilities of which they have
no personal knowledge. On the other hand, such actions are encouraged
by physicians who are intimate with the case and who either do not want
to be involved in any litigation, or go "overboard" in presenting the case
for the side who has retained them.
A Texas intermediate appellate court ruled in a workmen's com-
pensation case that the limitation of cross-examination of the employer's
medical expert by the claimant as to whether he testified for a lot of
insurance companies and whether he quite frequently examined patients
for insurance companies, was improper, but not prejudicial. 2 On the
other hand a Florida appellate court ruled in an automobile accident case
that the trial court did not err in limiting the cross-examination of the
injured person's chief medical witness for the purpose of establishing his
bias or interest and the fact that he was under censure by the county
medical society.3 The court also said that the scope of the cross-exami-
nation of a witness to show bias or interest was a matter within the trial
court's discretion.
Now let us examine some of the rules set down by the courts re-
cently in regard to medical witnesses. We should first consider the local-
ity or community rule as to expert witnesses in malpractice cases. This
* A.B., M.D., Univ. of Penna.; LL.B., Dickinson School of Law; Adjunct Assoc. Prof.,
Long Island U., Bklyn. College of Pharmacy Div.; Special Lecturer, Law and Medi-
cine, Dickinson School of Law.
1 20 App. Div. 2d 529, 244 N.Y.S. 2d 690 (1965), aff'd 16 N.Y. 2d 572, 260 N.Y.S. 2d 842
(1965).
2 Martin v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 388 S.W. 2d 27, 31 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
3 Alvarez v. Mauney, 175 So. 2d 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
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rule was originally formulated when communications were usually slow
or nonexistent, but it has lost much of its significance now because of the
increasing number of medical schools, the free interchange of scientific
information, 4 and the national uniformity of the certification require-
ments of all nineteen American specialty boards.5
Knowledge and experience has been established by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey as the true standards, and it made no difference to
that court that the medical expert was licensed in New York and not in
New Jersey.6 Nor does the size of the community make any difference,
so long as it is shown that the standards for the general practitioner are
comparable.
In the Montgomery case7 the court also said that "Proximate cause
does not change with the locality." A Georgia intermediate appellate
court ruled, in a case involving an orthopedic surgeon's testimony in
regard to a patient's treatment resulting in Volkmann's ischemic con-
tracture, that the expert witness was clearly qualified by reason of edu-
cation, training and experience, to testify as an expert. The reasons for
the locality rule as to expert testimony no longer have any validity, ex-
cept perhaps in those few areas of medicine where knowledge of proper
treatment is limited geographically by presence of disease or because of
special facilities for study.'
Nor is a physician incompetent to testify as an expert merely
because he is not a specialist in the particular field involved, said the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.'
A general practitioner was permitted to testify in a suit against a car-
diologist who failed to diagnose a case of hypothyroidism over a period
of six years. The court said that the training and specialization of a wit-
ness goes to the weight, not to the admissibility of his testimony.
It also would be well to examine at this time the physician-patient
privilege rule (in most cases covered by statute) as it applies to medical
testimony. A New York court dismissed a charge against a woman for
criminally inducing an abortion on herself, because the evidence sup-
porting the indictment came from the testimony of the woman's physician
4 Montgomery v. Stary, 84 So. 2d 34, 39 (Fla. 1955).
5 Greenwood and Frederickson, Specialization in the Medical and Legal Professions,
at 19 (1964).
6 Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A. 2d 680, 683 (1953). See also Teig v. St.
John's Hospital, 387 P. 2d 527 (1963), where experience of physician was sufficient to
make him familiar with the standards of the general locality even though he lived
50 miles away in another city and another state, and had never been in the com-
munity involved, and Christopher v. U.S., 237 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Penna. 1965), where
an expert from Philadelphia, Penna., was permitted to testify in a Baltimore, Md.
malpractice case.
7 Montgomery v. Stary, supra note 4 at 40.
8 Murphy v. Little, 112 Ga. App. 517, 145 S.E. 2d 760, 764 (1965).




before the grand jury.10 Since he had acquired that information in the
course of examining and treating the woman, the physician-patient privi-
lege barred the disclosure before the grand jury, just as it would in
a trial. In a workman's compensation case in the same state, the physi-
cian-patient privilege was waived because of the claimant's proof of the
cause of death in support of the compensation claim." This proof, said
the court, opened the door. The patient also waives the physician-patient
privilege by calling the physician to testify as to the extent and perma-
nence of his injuries, and the physician could be cross-examined on any
point that could have a bearing on the injured person's disability and the
cause thereof.12 The opposing party can call the attending physician as
a witness even though the privilege is not waived, because the attending
physician is not disqualified from giving expert testimony in response to
proper hypothetical questions, provided that in answering he disregards
what he learned and observed while attending the patient and his own
opinion based thereon. 13 This decision really makes a mockery of the
statute in Ohio providing for physician-patient privilege, even though it
may aid in fostering justice. It would be quite easy for a skilled attorney
to word hypotheticals in such a manner as to get the attending physi-
cian's true thoughts about the claimant's injuries across to the jury.
What kinds of testimony are physicians permitted to give? A New
York court ruled that two physicians, against whom a suit for damages
had been brought by a patient who developed peritonitis as a result of
a fecal fistula occurring after an appendectomy, were required in a pre-
trial discovery proceeding, to answer those questions which called for an
expression of expert opinion.14 On the other hand, a physician can be
forced to testify as an adverse expert witness against himself. An Ohio
court said that a duty to testify is owed to society, not to individual par-
ties, and a person has no right to obstruct the administration of justice by
withholding information that is relevant to a judicial proceeding. A de-
fendant physician may be compelled over his objection to provide that
testimony.15
Nor can a physician refuse to testify because of lack of compensa-
tion, said a Georgia court.', An orthopedic surgeon was not allowed to
testify as to the cause of an accident in which the one driver allegedly
lapsed into a diabetic coma.' 7 The physician admitted that he had never
10 N.Y. v. McAlpin, 270 N.Y.S. 2d 899 (App. Div. 1966).
11 Beeler v. Hildan, Crown Container Corp., 271 N.Y.S. 2d 373 (App. Div. 1966).
12 Scofield v. Haskell, 180 Neb. 324, 142 N.W. 2d 597, 601 (1966).
13 Vincenzo v. Newhart, 7 Ohio App. 2d 97, 219 N.E. 2d 212 (1966).
14 Rogotzki v. Schept, 91 N.J. Super. 135, 219 A. 2d 426, 436 (1966).
15 Oleksiw v. Weidener, 207 N.E. 2d 375 (Ohio 1965).
16 Logan v. Chatham Co., 113 Ga. App. 491, 148 S.E. 2d 471, 473 (1966).
17 Arnold v. Loose, 352 F. 2d 959, 963 (3rd Cir. 1965).
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read any text on diabetes and he did not know who the leading authority
in the field was or which was the leading treatise. For any physician in
this day and age to admit that he has not read any text on diabetes is
incomprehensible. The cross-examination of a physician on the basis of
a medical text which he has not read or of which he is not knowledgeable
is not permitted."8
A physician who makes only a superficial examination of a body,
and had never seen the decedent before, is not qualified to express an
opinion as to the cause of death on the basis of his own findings.19 He
could, however, answer proper hypotheticals stating the nature of the
injuries which would be used by him in forming a basis for an expert
opinion. A coroner's testimony on the findings of a postmortem exami-
nation performed two days after death was properly admitted in a mur-
der trial, even though no showing had been made that the body was in
the same condition when he made the examination as it was immediately
after the killing.20 In a similar case the autopsy findings were admissible,
even though the autopsy was performed by the County Medical Exam-
iner and the witness was the Associate County Medical Examiner.21
A physician's testimony at a preliminary examination was properly
admitted at a rape trial because the accused was represented by an attor-
ney who cross-examined the physician at the preliminary hearing. The
physician was not available for the trial because of his military obliga-
tions, but the reading of his testimony at the trial did not violate the
accused's constitutional right to confrontation, because of the prior cross-
examination. 22
Whose testimony is entitled to greater weight? In a workman's
compensation case, a Louisiana court said that where the injury for
which recovery is sought falls within a particular field of medicine,
testimony of a specialist in that field is entitled to greater weight than
that of a general practitioner.23 But the same court in another work-
men's compensation case accorded greater weight to the testimony of a
general practitioner who had an opportunity over a long treatment pe-
riod to observe the patient.24 The specialists in this case only saw the
patient briefly, and chiefly for the purpose of testifying. It appears that
the court in these cases did not establish any general rule as to the
weight of a particular type of physician's testimony, but is in essence
18 Ward v. Lamb, 240 Ark. 850, 402 S.W. 2d 675 (1966).
19 Branch v. Dempsey, 265 N.C. 733, 145 S.E. 2d 395, 405 (1965).
20 Kemp v. Ala., 278 Ala. 637, 179 So. 2d 762, 765 (1965).
21 Viser v. Texas, 396 S.W. 2d 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
22 Mich. v. Dusterwinkle, 3 Mich. App. 150, 141 N.W. 2d 719 (1966).
23 Ware v. Missouri Valley Dredging Co., 177 So. 2d 788 (La. Ct. App. 1965). See
also Joyner v. Brewton Lumber Co., 171 So. 2d 811 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
24 Gates v. Ashy Constr. Co., 171 So. 2d 742, 745 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
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saying that the greatest weight will be given to the testimony of that
physician who knows the most about the particular patient and his par-
ticular illness.
An attempt has been made to review what the courts have recently
said about medical witnesses and their testimony. Many questions can
be asked about particular decisions, and indeed, an entire article could
be written about individual cited cases. The only purpose of this paper
is to review the recent decisions in order to give you a panoramic view
of the type of questions which the courts are being asked to answer
about the medical witness and his testimony.
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